Computer Science and Game Theory Papers of the Week

Such financial planning should also account for the time value of money: profits earned earlier can accumulate interest, providing additional funds for future subsidies. Motivated by this observation, we introduce global budget balance with interest, under which a platform starting with no funds can use both trading profits and accrued interest to finance subsidies.

This raises the central question of this paper: can there be a stable data exchange in such competitive environments? We formalize this via a model of $n$ firms exchanging fractions of their datasets, with predictive performance feeding into market competition.

We study the online fair division of indivisible chores among $n$ agents under upgrade recourse, where earlier assignments may be revised but each chore previously assigned to an agent must be replaced by a distinct chore that she finds no more costly.

We propose the Open Inference Market (OIM), which replaces the missing asymmetry with an economic mechanism.

We study approximate Nash equilibria in nonatomic congestion games, with the goal of understanding how much the social cost can change when the equilibrium condition is relaxed.

Computation of Nash equilibria is a central problem in algorithmic game theory, yet exact equilibrium computation is $\mathsf{PPAD}$-complete even for two-player games. This hardness motivates the study of polynomial-time algorithms for approximate Nash equilibria.

We propose a research vision for a kinetic theory of collective intelligence in large-scale multi-agent learning systems.

In this study, we assess the feasibility of ECT for metastatic non-small cell lung cancer (NSCLC) under clinically realistic follow-up constraints.

This study examines how inherited local regulatory discretion shapes rule-based delegation and reward-based contracting in China’s Certified Emission Reduction (CCER) program.

Given $n$ agents and $n$ items in an unknown metric space, our goal is to match agents to items so that the total distance between matched pairs is small.

A well-known conjecture in online algorithms is that the (randomized) competitive ratio of online budgeted allocation is $1-1/e$. We refute this conjecture and show that every randomized online algorithm has competitive ratio at most $1 - 1/e - \varepsilon$ for a (small) absolute constant $\varepsilon > 0$.

We propose a simple ordinal peer-prediction mechanism that rewards agents based on pairwise agreement, measured by Kendall tau.

The case $\epsilon = 0$ is the standard setting without agent redundancy, and we use $\rho_{0,n}$ and $\rho_n$ interchangeably.

Autobidding equilibria link advertisers' value multipliers or participation probabilities through aggregate budget and return-on-investment (ROI) constraints. We establish the exact computational complexity of finding these equilibria across several canonical settings: exact equilibrium computation is $\mathsf{FIXP}$-complete for second-price ROI pacing, budget- or ROI-constrained generalized second-price (GSP) sponsored shopping, and second-price throttling.

Mechanism design literature addresses institutional structure and does not explain well what happens to particular mechanisms during a shock, whereas risk research literature addresses crisis description without comparing differences across mechanisms systematically. With stablecoin price stability as its theme, this paper will perform a systematic literature review.

Dielectric elastomer actuator (DEA)-driven capsule robots convert periodic excitations into net translation through passive constraints, yet a systematic study on optimal constraint design remains largely unexplored. To address this gap, we present a comparative numerical study of six passive constraint families that range from linear and bistable springs to limit stops and polynomial shapes and encompass 2447 configurations under a reference condition.

To address the limitations of existing bridge durability evaluation methods, including poor adaptability to freezing environments with salt exposure and defects of single weighting strategies, a durability evaluation method for concrete bridges under freezing environments with salt exposure is proposed by integrating game theory and matter-element extension theory.

In this paper we resolve the question of whether AltOMD achieves near-constant regret in the affirmative.